Abstract-In this technical note, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto solutions in infinite horizon cooperative differential games with open loop information structure. First, we reformulate the notion of Pareto optimality which entails to solving several constrained optimal control problems with a specific constraint structure. Then, we provide weak sufficient conditions under which all Pareto candidates can be obtained by solving a weighted sum optimal control problem, with weightvectors belonging to the unit simplex. We supplement our results with relevant examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative differential game problems arise when multiple players, affecting a dynamic system, coordinate their actions/controls with an intent to optimize their objectives. In this technical note, we study infinite horizon cooperative differential games which appear, quite naturally, when no bound can be placed on the decision horizon, and they constitute some of the widely used models in economic theory, for example, optimal economic growth and environmental economics, see [4] , [10] . Pareto optimality plays a central role in analyzing these problems. Since, basically, the cooperative problem is equivalent to the consideration of an optimization problem where one player has multiple objectives, its solution is important for solving multi-criteria optimization problems also.
The main contribution of the technical note is in the consideration of an infinite horizon framework. Our results extend the recent finite horizon framework [5] to the infinite horizon. It was shown in [5] that necessary conditions for Pareto optimality coincide with those of a weighted sum optimal control problem. However, a similar conclusion in the infinite horizon case requires technical assumptions on the control space and system parameters, see [1] , [3] , [7] , [9] , [13] , [14] for the optimal control problem. In this technical note, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality in infinite horizon cooperative differential games. The closest references we could track, towards finding Pareto solutions in differential games, are [17] and [18] . Almost all of these works address the problem of finding Pareto solutions in the finite horizon case.
This technical note is structured as follows. In Section II we present a necessary and sufficient characterization of Pareto optimality which entails to reformulate the Pareto optimality problem as solving a set of infinite horizon optimal control problems with a specific constraint structure. As a consequence, the necessary conditions for Pareto opti- mality are related to the necessary conditions of these constrained optimal control problems. It is well known that transversality conditions, which constitute a part of necessary conditions, for infinite horizon optimal control problems are incomplete as the behavior of co-state variables and Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints display pathological asymptotic behavior at infinity, see [7] , [13] , [14] . More precisely, the natural horizon transversality conditions-an extension of the corresponding finite horizon transversality conditions-would be that the co-state variable tends to zero as time approaches infinity, the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints are non negative and the multiplier associated with the objective is strictly positive (also called as normality). In general, none of these conditions are guaranteed to hold true in the infinite horizon case. These issues have inspired a number of studies [1] , [2] to seek for sufficient conditions under which some of the natural transversality conditions become necessary optimality conditions for the infinite horizon models. In Section III, taking the discounted autonomous framework, we derive necessary conditions for optimality for these constrained optimal control problems in Theorem III.1. Owing to the specific constraint structure we observe that the set of multipliers associated with the objective and the constraints would belong to the non-negative orthant. Then, we present conditions (Assumption III.1) under which the multiplier set does not include the origin (zero element), which translates (Theorem III.4) to obtaining all Pareto solutions by solving a weighted sum optimal control problem. In Section IV, we provide sufficient conditions (Theorem IV.1) for Pareto optimality and finally Section V concludes.
II. PARETO OPTIMALITY
The system or the dynamic environment where a finite set of players N = {1, 2, · · · , N} interact is modeled by a non-autonomous ordinary differential equation given bẏ
n represents the state of the system and u i (t) ∈ R m i represents the control action of the player i at time t ≥ 0. Since, the players coordinate their actions, we denote the joint action by u(t) : 
We assume an open loop information pattern. The pair of functions (x, u) : [0, ∞) → R n × C is called an admissible pair of (1) if u is piecewise continuous, for which the left-and right-hand limit exist and x is continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable, which satisfies (1) for all points t where u is continuous. The function x is called a state trajectory with initial condition x 0 and the function u is called an admissible control. The set of all admissible controls is denoted by U. We assume that the vector function f :
We assume that the integrals involved in the player's objectives converge absolutely for every admissible pair (x, u). Since we are interested in the joint minimization of the objectives of the players, the cost incurred by a single player cannot be minimized without increasing the cost incurred by the other players. So, we consider solutions which cannot be improved upon by all the players 0018-9286 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
simultaneously; the so called Pareto optimal solutions. Formally, the set of controls u * ∈ U is Pareto optimal if the set of inequalities
, ∀i ∈N , with at least one of the inequalities being strict, does not allow for any solution in u ∈ U. The correspond- 
represents the state transition matrix associated with the autonomous differential equationẋ(
denotes the vector with entries ω i . We define the weighted sum
u(t)).
A well known way to find Pareto optimal controls is to solve a parametrized optimal control problem [8] , [19] . Lemma II.1, given below, states that every control minimizing a weighted sum of the cost function of all players (where all weights are strictly positive) is Pareto optimal. So, varying these positive weights one obtains, in principle, different Pareto optimal controls. A proof of the lemma can be found in [8] .
Lemma II.1 ([8] ):
Then u * is Pareto optimal. Being a sufficient condition, however, it is unclear whether we obtain all Pareto optimal controls in this way. In fact the above procedure may yield no Pareto optimal controls while an infinite number of them exist. The following example illustrates this point.
Example II.1: Consider the cooperative differential game with the dynamicsẋ(t)=u 1 (t)−u 2 (t), x(0) = 0, and the cost functions
Here, we do not consider formation of sub-coalitions and the possibility of utility transfers during the course of the game. We assume players make binding agreements towards cooperation at the start of the game and continue for ever, which requires the use of pre-commitment strategies by the players. This aspect motivates the use of the open loop information structure in the technical note. 
We observe that for a fixed player i the constraint set U i defined in (4) depends on the entries of the Pareto optimal value that represents the loss of all the players in i − . Therefore all Pareto solutions can be obtained by solving N constrained optimal control problems. Using this idea we analyze the game problem (1-2). We introduce the following notation for an N person infinite horizon cooperative differential game
Let u * be a Pareto optimal control for the problem (P ) and x * be the trajectory generated by u * . Using Lemma II.1, (P ) is equivalently written as N constrained optimal control problems, denoted by (P i ) for each player i ∈ N , as follows:
Using the above, the control space U i defined by (4) takes the following special form:
is an optimal control problem with isoperimetric constraints. The constraint set U i can be represented equivalently by introducing auxiliary statesx
Using the above, the unconstrained representation of (P i ) is then given as
Collecting the above, and from Lemma II.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary II.1: u * is a Pareto optimal control for the cooperative game problem (P ) if and only if u * is an optimal control for all the problems
The optimal control problems (P i ) have mixed end point constraints, i.e., lim t→∞ x(t) is free and lim t→∞x i j (t), ∀j ∈ i − are constrained. Let H i (.) denote the Hamiltonian associated with the problem (P i ) and be defined as u(t) ). Next, applying Pontryagin's maximum principle to (P i ) necessary conditions for optimality follow easily. Since the Hamiltonian H i (.) is independent ofx i j , the co-states associated with the constraints would take the form μ i j (t) = μ i j (constants) in the necessary conditions. Let
. If the game problem (P ) is finite horizon type then the transversality conditions associated with the problem (P i ) are λ i (T ) = 0, 0 < T < ∞ and μ i j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ i − and the maximum principle holds in normal form i.e., λ 0 i = 1, see [6, proposition 3.16] . So, the multiplier vector satisfies λ i ∈ R N + \ {0} naturally. Using these ideas it was shown in [5] that necessary conditions for Pareto optimality for (P ) are the same as the necessary conditions for optimality of a weighted sum optimal control problem with weightvectors belonging to P N . However for the infinite horizon version none of these transversality conditions necessarily hold true for optimality. Further, only under strict restrictions on system parameters, also called as growth conditions, can one ensure the extension of the finite horizon necessary conditions to the infinite horizon case, see [14, Theorem 12, pg . 234], [1] and [13] . In other words, the finite horizon transversality conditions and the normality condition, generally, do not naturally carry over to the infinite horizon case, see [1] , [7] , [14] for counterexamples to illustrate this behavior. For the unconstrained free endpoint discounted autonomous infinite horizon optimal control problems, Michel, in [9] , gives necessary conditions for optimality, and shows that the Lagrange multiplier associated with the objective is non-negative in the necessary conditions. In the present case, the problems (P i ) have mixed end point constraints with a special structure due to Lemma II.1. We exploit this feature and show in the next section, in Theorem III.1, that for the discounted autonomous case it is necessary that λ i ∈ R N + for optimality. Further, imposing certain restrictions we show in Theorem III.4 that necessary conditions for Pareto optimality are the same as those of a weighted sum optimal control problem.
III. NECESSARY CONDITIONS
In this section we analyze cooperative games defined by autonomous dynamics with exponentially discounted player's costs. We represent the discounted autonomous infinite horizon differential game as
Again, we assume that the admissible control space U consists of piecewise continuous functions as defined in Section II. Functions f and g i , ∀i ∈N defined in [0, ∞) × R n × C are valued in R n and R respectively; we assume that f and g i , ∀i ∈N are continuous and continuously differentiable with respect to the state variable. Further, we assume that the players' objectives converge absolutely for every admissible pair (x, u). The discount factor ρ is taken as a strictly positive real number. Next, if u * is a Pareto optimal control for the game problem (P ρ ), then from Corollary II.1 u * is optimal for all the constrained optimal control problem (P ρ i ), defined for each player i ∈ N , as
Next, we derive necessary conditions for (P ρ i ) by approximating the problem with a fixed end point finite horizon optimal control problem. We adopt the methodology given by Michel [9] for free end point unconstrained problems. Let (x * , u * ) be the optimal admissible pair for problem (P ρ i ), we fix T > 0 and define h i (z) as
Next, we consider the following truncated and augmented problem (P
Remark III.1: Here, note that taking v(t) ≡ 1 yields z(t) = t and the objective is same as the that of P ρ at the optimal solution. Further, the finite horizon problem (P The following lemma, see the Appendix for the proof, relates the optimal solution of (P ρ i ) to the optimal solution (P ρ i T ). We notice that the special structure of constraints given by (6) plays an important role in arriving at this conclusion.
Lemma III.1:
, is an optimal admissible pair for the problem (P ρ i T
).
Using the above lemma, we give necessary conditions for the problem (P 
t, x(t), u(t), λ(t)) :=λ i (t)f (x(t), u(t)) + e −ρt G(λ i , x(t), u(t)) and the following conditions are satisfied
Remark III.2: Though the approach in Lemma III.1 and Theorem III.1 is similar to the method given in [9] , the main differences lie in the problem formulation. In [9] , the necessary conditions are obtained for the free endpoint unconstrained infinite horizon optimal control problem. Whereas, the game problem (P ρ ), due to Corollary II.1, leads to N mixed endpoint constrained optimal control problems (P ρ i ) with a special constraint structure. We observe that, due to the special structure of the constraint set U i , the term G(λ i , x * (t), u * (t)), weighted instantaneous undiscounted cost of the players, appears in the necessary conditions for (P ρ i ), with λ i ∈ R N + . In the finite horizon case, it was shown in [5] that, if λ i , ∀i ∈N belong to R N + \ {0}, then necessary conditions for Pareto optimality coincide with those of a weighted sum optimal control problem, with weightvectors belonging to P N . Next, we give conditions which ensure the necessity of λ i ∈ R N + \ {0}, ∀i ∈N in (7) as the assumption.
Assumption III.1: Assume m ≥ n and the Hamiltonian associated with the problem (P
Theorem III.2: Let Assumption III.1 holds true. Then
Proof: If Assumption III.1 holds true, in particular u * (t) ∈ intC, then the minimum condition (7a) leads to e
Let us assume λ i = 0, then we haveγ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, ∞), and from (7c), we have that γ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, ∞). Further, the above minimum condition leads to
is an n × m matrix. Since, m ≥ n and there exists a τ ∈ [0, ∞) such that rank(f u (x * (τ ), u * (τ ))) = n, we have λ i (τ ) = 0. So, for this τ , it holds that (λ i , λ i (τ ), γ i (τ )) = 0. But this violates the necessary condition (7e). So, λ i ∈ R N + \ {0}. If the system (1) is linear time invariant, we notice in the following theorem that controllability 2 of the system ensures the necessity of
Assume f (x, u) = Ax + Bu and g i (x, u) are convex in u for all i ∈N . Further, the optimal candidate u * satisfies u * (t) ∈ intC for all t ∈ [0, ∞) and the pair (A, B) (or the system (1)) is controllable. 3 Then 
) is a Pareto optimal value for problem 2 For linear quadratic cooperative differential games additional properties about Pareto solutions can be obtained. We discuss these aspects in an accompanying technical note that is submitted elsewhere. 3 For linear time invariant continuous time systems zero controllablity, defined as the ability of the input to steer the system from any arbitrary initial state to zero in a finite amount of time, coincides with various other notions of controllablity. In particular, all these notions are equivalent with the algebraic rank condition [16] .
(P ) then there exists an α ∈ P N , a vector l 0 ∈ R n , a continuous and piece-wise differentiable co-state function λ : [0, ∞) → R n and a real valued continuous function γ : [0, ∞) → R such that the Hamiltonian is defined by H(α, t, 
x(t), u(t), λ(t)) :=λ (t)f (t, x(t), u(t)) + e −ρt G(α, x(t), u(t)) and the following conditions are satisfied
Proof: If Assumption III.1 holds true then for each problem
and observe that α ∈ P N . Taking the summation of (7b) for all i ∈ N and defining λ(t) = (1/d) i∈N λ i (t) we observe that condition (8b) is satisfied. The Hamiltonian condition (8a) follows in a similar manner. Taking the summation of (7c) for all i ∈ N and defining γ(t) = (1/d) i∈N γ i (t), the conditions (8d) and (8e) are satisfied.
From the above theorem, if Assumption III.1 (or conditions in Theorem III.3) holds true then all Pareto candidates can be obtained by solving a weighted sum optimal control problem. Notice, the necessary conditions given in Theorem III.4 are still incomplete as they do not specify the behavior of the co-state function λ as t → ∞. So, in general, there exist many extremal trajectories for Pareto optimality. The terminal cost associated with the problem (P ρ i ) is zero. So, lim t→∞ λ i (t) = 0 is the natural transversality condition. However, this condition is guaranteed to hold true only by imposing restrictions on the system parameters. In [9] , Michel gives conditions under which the natural transversality condition holds for the unconstrained free endpoint discounted autonomous optimal control problem. We show in the next Corollary III.1 that these conditions, formulated as Assumption III.2 below, also suffice to conclude that the transversality condition lim t→∞ λ i (t) = 0 holds in (7) for all i ∈N , and as a result the condition lim t→∞ λ(t) = 0 holds true in (8) . We omit the proof of Corollary III.1 as it is essentially similar to [9] , see also [12] .
Assumption III.2: g i (x(t), u(t)), ∀i ∈ N is non-positive (or can be made non-positive) and the set of possible values of the state dynamics, evaluated along an optimal state trajectory x * for an arbitrary control value w ∈ C, given by {f (x * (t), w) : w ∈ C} contains an open ball around 0 for all t ≥ T 0 ≥ 0, where T 0 is chosen arbitrarily.
Corollary III.1: Let Assumption III.2 hold true. Then, a Pareto optimal control for the game problem (P ρ ) satisfies in addition to the conditions (8), the transversality condition lim t→∞ λ(t) = 0.
Following the remark [9, pg. 979 ] the non-positivity requirement in the Assumption III.2 can be relaxed as: the set of speeds f (x * (t), w) contains a neighborhood of 0 in R n , for w belonging to a subset C of C such that the supremum limit of e −rt g i (x * (t), w) is non-positive. The interpretation of the assumption is that the optimal state is such that there always exist controls allowing for changes of the speed in all directions at a given level. Usually in economic applications one imposes the additional requirement of convergence of admissible state and control trajectories. This is a quite natural assumption if one likes to analyze phenomena that are out of their equilibrium setting. Further, this restriction usually helps to reduce the number of candidates for Pareto optimality and also enables to meet Assumption III.2.
To summarize, the conditions given in Assumption III.1 are sufficient to obtain all candidate Pareto solutions by solving the set of necessary conditions resulting from a related weighted sum optimal control problem. Further, Assumption III.2 ensures that the natural transversality condition extends to the infinite horizon case, which reduces the number of candidates for Pareto optimality. In the next section we give conditions which imply that a candidate solution is indeed Pareto optimal.
IV. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
It is well known that if the action spaces as well as the players objective functions are convex then the minimization of the weighted sum of the objectives results in all Pareto solutions. For dynamic optimization problems it is a difficult task, in general, to check if the players objectives are convex functions of controls. However, under some conditions the solutions of (8) result in Pareto optimal controls. In this section we derive sufficient conditions for a joint strategy/control to be Pareto optimal. The sufficient conditions given in the theorem below are inspired by Arrow's sufficient conditions [14] in optimal control. Note that these sufficient conditions are given for general non-autonomous models.
Theorem IV.1: Assume that there exist α i ∈ (0, 1), i ∈N and a co-
8b). Introduce the Hamiltonian H(t, α, x(t), u(t), λ(t)) =λ (t)f (t, x(t), u(t)) + G(α, t, x(t), u(t)). Assume that the Hamiltonian has a minimum with respect to u(t), at u * (t), for all x(t), denoted by H 0 (α, t, x(t), λ(t)) = min u(t) H(α, t, x(t), u(t), λ(t)). Let x
* be the state trajectory generated by u
Next, from the definition of the Hamiltonian, the above inequality can be written as
). Taking the integrals on both sides we have
. As x * (0) = x(0) = x 0 and λ(0) is bounded the above inequality is given as
The following example illustrates the application of necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality.
Example IV.1: Consider a fishery game with two players. The evolution of the stock of fish, in a particular area, is governed by the Gompertz growth equation (captures the growth of population in a confined space i.e., birth rates first increase and then decrease as resource limits are reached)
where x(t) refers to the stock of fish, and a > 0, b > 0. It is assumed that x(t) ≥ 2, t ∈ [0, ∞). In (9), the stock of fish x(t) depends upon ax(t) births, bx(t) ln x(t) deaths and the fishing efforts of player i, u i (t) = w i (t)x(t), at each point in time t. Each fisherman tries to maximize his utility given by
−ρt ln u i (t)dt, i = 1, 2. We assume 0 < ≤ w i (t) < ∞ for the utility to be well defined. Taking the transformation y(t) = ln x(t) the cooperative game is given as
With straightforward calculations it is easy to verify that the above problem satisfies the Assumption III.1 or Theorem III.2 due to its linear structure and convex costs. So, all the Pareto candidates are obtained by solving a weighted sum optimal control problem with weightvectors in P 2 . We define the weighted Hamiltonian as H(α, t, y, (w 1 , w 2 ), λ) :=λ(t)(a−by(t)−w 1 (t)−w 2 (t))−e −ρt (y(t) + α ln w 1 (t)+(1−α) ln w 2 (t)). Further, we have g i (y(t), (w 1 (t), w 2 (t)) ≤ − ln 2 and controllablity of the system (10) ensures that a neighborhood of zero is contained in f (.) = a − by(t) − w 1 (t) − w 2 (t) for all (w 1 (t), w 2 (t)). So, Assumption III.2 holds true and the extremal trajectories satisfy the transversality condition lim t→∞ λ(t) = 0. Taking H w i = 0, i = 1, 2 gives w *
(t) = −(α/λ(t))e
−ρt and w *
(t) = −((1 − α)/λ(t))e
−ρt . The co-state trajectory is governed byλ(t) = bλ(t) + e −ρt , lim t→∞ λ(t) = 0, and the solution is given as λ(t) = −(e −ρt /(ρ + b)), t ≥ 0. The candidates for Pareto optimal controls are given by 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this technical note, we derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto solutions in infinite horizon cooperative differential games with an open loop information structure. First, we reformulated the notion of Pareto optimality as solving several constrained optimal control problems with a special structure. Next, we studied Pareto optimality in discounted autonomous differential game models. Here, we derived necessary conditions for optimality associated with these constrained optimal control problems, and showed that the set of Lagrange multipliers associated with player's objective and constraints belong to the non-negative orthant. Then, we presented conditions under which the element zero does not belong to the multiplier set, and as a result all the Pareto solutions can be obtained by solving a weighted sum optimal control problem. Finally, we presented sufficient conditions for Pareto optimality.
The condition that players cooperate indefinitely could be too restrictive in some real world problems, for instance, joint ventures. A method based on moving horizons seems to be a logical and flexible alternative to the infinite horizon approach. Further, it would be interesting to see how the necessary and sufficient conditions can be formulated if the feedback information pattern is assumed.
